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ABSTRACT
This article proposes a fresh reading of the Heidelberg Catechism from the 
perspective of an ethics of care, a new paradigm of doing ethics, strongly influenced 
by feminist philosophy. In its anthropology, this approach in ethics emphasizes 
human relationality, mutual dependency and vulnerability. Though there are strong 
affinities with theological anthropology, the ethics of care still lacks a theological 
framework. The thesis argued here, is that the Heidelberg Catechism offers essential 
elements for a “theology of care”. It describes 1. God as a caring, ‘mothering” 
God; 2. human beings as having care as their essence and divine vocation; and 
3. the relationship between God and human beings as a relationship of mutual care. 
The care perspective in the Heidelberg Catechism is limited, however, because it 
does not give a full account of the open endedness of the relationship between God 
and humanity. 
1.  THE GOD OF THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM
In the Netherlands, the Heidelberg Catechism became recently well known 
again by an author who pleaded for a definitive farewell to it. Maarten ’t 
Hart, raised in an orthodox Reformed milieu in Maassluis, took leave of 
his faith in God with his bestselling novel Een vlucht regenwulpen (1978; 
transl. 1986 as A flight of curlews). The novel has as its motto: 
Lord’s Day 10, article 27: What do you understand by the providence 
of God?
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The almighty, everywhere-present power of God, whereby, as it were 
by His hand, He still upholds heaven and earth with all creatures, 
and so governs them that herbs and grass, rain and drought, fruitful 
and barren years, meat and drink, health and sickness, riches 
and poverty, indeed, all things come not by chance, but by His 
fatherly hand.
The novel depicts Maarten’s youth in Maassluis. It can be read as an 
homage to his mother, who dies after a long suffering from throat cancer. 
A crucial scene in the book is the visit of two elders from the congregation, 
who rebuke his mother for her sinful state in the nearness of death. Her son 
Maarten attacks the two men physically and chases them out of the house. 
Outside, he realizes what he has been doing. 
I am certain now, with the definitive certainty where the Calvinists 
always talk about, that Christianity is a sham, yes that the whole life 
is a vile lie, and that somewhere in the universe a god is satanically 
laughing about my grief, the god of Lord’s Day 10, who’s fatherly 
hand sent my mother a sickness, a pretaste of her suffering in hell. 
That is how god is, the god of the HC, the god who hates people 
so intensely that he invented throat cancer for them. Even human 
beings are not capable to kill each other in such a wicked way as 
god can do with such an illness (´t Hart 1978: 79, my translation). 
The novel – one million copies sold and made into a successful movie 
in 19811 – has had an enormous impact on the post war baby boom 
generation, and confirmed many in their farewell to Christian faith. It lead 
also Dutch Reformed theologians as Herman Wiersinga to their criticism 
of the HC and the “sadistic” God (Sölle 1973:20) of Providence, who sends 
suffering to the innocent. The image of God in the HC, Wiersinga says, 
needs to be christologically reconstructed: God is not the cosmic power 
behind the suffering, he is sympathetic in the suffering, fighting against it. 
(Wiersinga1975:19, 66; Wiersinga 1992:52).
I am not going into the theological strategy chosen by many theologians, 
since then, confronted with the question of theodicy after Auschwitz, 
in their option for a radical theology of the cross. A Christological 
concentration and reduction of the doctrine of providence may answer 
some questions, but raise new ones as well. The theological concept of a 
crucified God cannot silence the voices of the sufferers who are searching 
for meaning and cry for justice. However, I do not want to go into that 
dogmatic question. As an ethicist, working in the field of health care and 
social work, I would like to propose a fresh reading of the HC from the 
1 http://www.letterenfonds.nl/nl/boek/690/een-vlucht-regenwulpen
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perspective of an ethics of care. The term stand for an approach in ethics I 
feel sympathetic with, but which still lacks a theological framework. I think, 
that’s at least the intuition I want to explore, that the HC offers essential 
elements for a theology of care. 
2. “WE ARE CARE” (L. BOFF)
A few words on the ethics of care. Though there are strong affinities 
between a theology of love (the so called agapistic tradition) and the 
ethics of care (Groenhout 2003:17ff.) we are still waiting for a more 
developed theology of care that takes up and incorporates the insights 
and impulses of the ethics of care as it was developed by feminist authors 
since the 1980s. There is a long tradition in practical theology focusing 
on pastoral care as an ecclesial practice. Guiding authors in this field like 
Elaine L. Graham also integrated explicitly women’s experience into her 
outline for a “Pastoral Theology in an Age of Uncertainty” (Graham 1996, 
especially 172ff.). The focus of her pastoral theology, however, is the 
pastoral practice, understood as “a diversity of activities on the part of the 
faith-community” (Graham 1996, 96, cf. 7). A full theology of care, however, 
would have to start and end with care, not as an element of dimension of 
human or Christian praxis, but as its core and essence.2 
The ethics of care aims more than just an applied ethics for the 
health care sector. It presents itself as a new paradigm of doing ethics, a 
fundamental understanding of human life and of living together. An ethics 
of care approach understands care as the most essential characteristic of 
being in the world. With Martin Heidegger, care should not be considered 
a phenomenon among others, but as an Existential, a fundamental mode 
of being. (Heidegger 2004: 238) “We do not have care. We are care.” 
(Boff 2007: 56) A theology of care that adopts this view, and understands 
care as the Alpha and Omega of human life in relationship with God, aims 
at a reframing3 of doing theology, a specific way of talking about God and 
God’s relation to the world. 
Reading the HC from the perspective of a theology of care, one reads 
another narrative of God in the HC than Maarten ’t Hart did in his novel. 
God is depicted as a caring God, and the dramatic relationship between 
2 There is reference to or discussion of the ethics of care in Graham 1996. 
3 “To ‘reframe’ means to change the conceptual and/or emotional setting 
or viewpoint in relation to which a situation is experience and to place it in 
another frame which fits the ‘facts’ of the same concrete situation equally or 
even better, and thereby changes its entire meaning.” (Stewart D. Govig, cited 
by Swinton 2007:15-16).
Acta Theologica Supplementum 20 2014
159
God and humanity displays itself as a relationship of mutual care. A “god 
who hates human beings so intensely that he invented throat cancer for 
them” (´t Hart 1978: 79) can’t be found in the text of the HC. 
Let us explore what the HC might contribute to the development of a 
theology of care. I start with some remarks on an ethics and a theology of 
care, before I come to the HC itself. 
A theology of care may take its starting point in the ethics of care, 
as developed since the 1980’s especially by feminist philosophers.4 The 
ethics of care’s conception of “care” is not limited to the formal practices 
of institutional health care, but offers a comprehensive perspective on the 
human condition. Care, and not for example work (purposive action and 
control), or thinking (rationality), is what makes humans primarily human. I 
care, therefore I am. (Boff 2007:68) Or even better, because every human 
being is a mother’s child: I am being cared for, therefore I am. Care has a 
double aspect, it entails attitude as well as action. Care stands for being 
devoted to someone or something, attention, being committed (to care 
about). This attitude leads to taking responsibility, being concerned by 
doing something (to care for, and take care of).5 As the liberation theologian 
Leonard Boff – as far as I can see the only one who put some steps on the 
road to a theology of care – writes: 
Care always accompanies the human being because the human 
being will never stop loving and devoting itself to someone (first 
sense), nor will the human being stop preoccupying and concerning 
itself for the loved one (second sense) (Boff 2007:59). 
Boff formulates the basic intuition of an ethic, or a theology of care 
approach as follows: 
To care is at the very root of the human being; it is there before 
anyone does anything. And if someone does do anything it is 
always accompanied by, and permeated with, a caring attitude 
(Boff 2007:15).
Taking this stance results in a specific anthropology, but also leads us 
to a specific theology. Boff asks 
4 Held (2006: 26), locates the beginnings of the ethics of care with a pioneering 
essay called “Maternal Thinking” by philosopher Sara Ruddick published in 
1980. Important figures to be mentioned, among others, are also Carol Gilligan, 
Nel Noddings, Eva Feder Kittay, Joan Tronto.
5 Leonardo Boff, Essential Care. An Ethics of Human Nature. London: SPCK 
2007, 58.
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what kind of image of the human being do we project when we 
discover the human being as a being-in-the-world-with-others 
always in relation, building his habitat, occupied with things, 
concerned with people, willing to suffer with and be happy with those 
to whom he fees united and whom he loves? The most adequate 
answer to this question will be: the human being is a being that takes 
care; moreover, his essence is found in caring. To have an attitude 
of care towards all he plans and does is the essential characteristic 
of the human being (Boff 2007:17).
What happens to theology when it is entirely re-thought from the 
paradigm of care? When it takes care as its “root metaphor”?6 Leonardo 
Boff makes at least a start with it. He takes up Heidegger’s intuition that 
care is “the basic constitutive phenomenon of human existence, and the 
clue to its interpretation.”(Heidegger 2004:238) But perhaps surprisingly, 
instead of offering a philosophical reconstruction of Heidegger’s 
Existentialanalyse, he tells a story: the fable-myth of Hyginus, a first 
Century freed slave, that inspired also Heidegger to his Being and Time. 
Once when Care was crossing a river, she saw some clay; she 
thoughtfully took up a piece and began to shape it. While she was 
meditating on what she had made, Jupiter [the heavens] came by. 
Care asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when 
she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade this, and 
demanded that it be given his name instead. While Care and Jupiter 
were disputing, Earth arose and desired that her own name be 
conferred on the creature, since she had furnished it with part of her 
body. They asked Saturn [History/ Time] to be their arbiter, and he 
made the following decision, which seemed a just one: “Since you, 
Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; 
and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. 
But since Care first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as 
long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as 
to its name, let it be called homo, for it is made out of humus (earth) 
(Heidegger 2004:242).
Taken from the Earth below, living with the Heavens above, moving 
forward in Time, the human soul belongs to Care, to Cura, who “holds” 
him for as long as he lives (Cura teneat, quamdiu vixerit). (Boff 2007: 21f.) 
6 The American philosopher Stephen Pepper (1967:3) defined root metaphor 
as “an area of empirical observation which is the point of origin for a world 
hypothesis.”
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Without care, the human being would only exist as a lump of clay in 
the banks of a river, or live as a disembodied angelic spirit outside 
historic time (Boff 2007:69). 
The myth of Hyginus reminds Genesis.7 The breath of life, breathed 
by the Spirit of God into the nostrils and turning Adam into a living being, 
(Genesis 2:7) is personified in the myth by Cura, Care. Care makes human 
beings really human. Boff, however, is reluctant when it comes to biblical 
theology, though he describes the God of Jesus as a compassionate 
“Father with the characteristics of a Mother” (Boff 2007:91), and refers 
to Jesus of Nazareth as “a being of care” (Boff 2007:121).8 Despite these 
references, Boff does not explore the theological consequences of these 
biblical observations. So how a theology inspired by the Scriptures will 
look like, when God is personified as Cura, a caring divinity? 
3. ELEMENTS OF AN ETHICS OF CARE IN THE HC
The HC, is my thesis, offers some central, albeit limited, insights for such 
a theology of care. It describes 1. God as a caring, “mothering” God; 
2. human beings as having care as their essence and divine vocation; 
and 3. the relationship between God and human beings as a relationship of 
mutual care. The care perspective in the HC is limited, because – as I want 
to argue at the end of my paper – it does not give a full account of the open 
endedness of the relationship between God and humanity. 
Let us start with the relationship between God and human beings as a 
relationship of mutual care. A theology of care, following the ethics of care, 
describes human beings, against the liberal Enlightenment view of the 
separated, autonomous self, as fundamentally connected (interdependent) 
(Pettersen 2008: 10f.) “I am not naturally alone. I am naturally in an relation 
from which I derive nourishment and guidance,”as Nel Noddings, one of 
the early founders of the ethics of care writes. 
When I am alone, either because I have detached myself or because 
circumstances have wrenched me free, I seek first and most naturally 
to reestablish my relatedness. My very individuality is defined in a 
set of relations. This is my basic reality (Noddings 1984:51).
7 Though Heidegger’s use of this fable in casting the female Cura as creator has 
been seen as a gendered inversion of the creation story of Genesis, in which 
woman is created last. Cf. Froese 2006:188. 
8 “In Hyginus, Care is not seen as a deity, rather it is seen as a personification of 
a fundamental way-of-being.” (Boff 2007: 56) 
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Correspondingly, in the HC also the language of relationality prevails. 
God is the loving Father, who maintains a dramatic care relationship with 
his children. The main question in the HC is not, as Eberhard Busch pointed 
out against Otto Weber, anthropology; it’s concern is not a description of 
the subjective, inner process of salvation, but the work done to us by the 
triune God, for us and with us) (Busch 1998:16,19,21,23). It’s basic theme 
is the free God and the free human being. (Busch 1998:24) Right from the 
start ( Lord’s Day [LD] 1.1.), we are considered to belong to Jesus Christ, 
not in the sense of being possessed by an owner, but like a child belonging 
to its parents, a beloved to his or her lover. And “no creature shall separate 
us from His love.” (LD 10.28) 
The HC defends a relational ontology, long before Enlightenment 
thinking found it necessary to take leave of it, replacing it by individual 
autonomy. A care relationship is an open, dynamic process. It has a 
hopeful scenario, in which the one who cares intends to contribute to the 
strength for life of the one cared for, enhance the power to live a life of 
one’s own. A care relationship, at the same time, has a dramatic structure; 
it entails a going through good and bad times together. This is precisely 
how in the HC the three parts on “Man’s misery”, “Man’s salvation” and 
“Thankfulness” function: as three moments in the ongoing care relationship 
of God and humanity. They should not be read as subsequent phases in 
time, but as always present dimensions in one relational drama. A specific 
anthropology follows: a human being has to be “defined” as the narrative 
of the life trajectory of someone who belongs and has been entrusted 
to the care of someone else or others. There is no essentialist definition 
possible of human beings as such, an und für sich. One cannot look at 
people, without bearing in mind that they are involved in a (love) story with 
God. (cf. Busch 1998:41,127)
Though the majesty of God is broadly painted out in the HC, the aim 
of the salvation process is not subjection, but a living together in the 
reciprocity of love, in order that a human being “might rightly know God 
his Creator, heartily love Him, and live with Him in eternal blessedness, to 
praise and glorify Him” (LD 3. 6) We might even speak of a mystic tenor 
in the HC – though in a limited sense, see my final conclusion – the goal 
of salvation is a dwelling together in freedom and mutuality of Lover and 
Beloved (Busch 1998:252) 
God is the One-Who-Cares; we are the ones Cared-for. Even when God 
is the almighty Creator, he has a particular, private relationship with me: he 
is (not only mine, but also) my father. In his concern, I am special. 
The HC employs a personal vocabulary and values – another 
important element for which the ethics of care (re)opens up our eyes 
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(Held 2006:9-13) – and highlights the role of emotions in the relationship 
between God and human beings. “Comfort” is the accolade which 
embraces the whole of the HC, but also fear, anguish pain and terrors 
(LD 16.44), sorrows and joy, cheerfulness are part of the divine-human 
drama (LD 19.52; 21.55;22.58) The HC cares for the whole human being, his 
body and soul. 
As in the ethics of care, in the HC the neediness and finiteness of the 
human body is explicitly acknowledged as the object of divine and human 
care. A theology of care also needs to be, as the HC presents itself is, 
down to earth. Humans are creatures of flesh and blood, with vital needs 
to be satisfied by “care and labour” (LD 50.125). Food, shelter, health, 
intimacy; the HC shows human beings as needy creatures, with a soul 
wanting for redemption ánd a fragile, vulnerable body, dependent on the 
“herbs and grass, rain and drought, fruitful and barren years, meat and 
drink, health and sickness, riches and poverty” – in short, the incalculable 
contingency of the fragile biosphere in which he takes part. (LD 10. 27) God 
does not only take care of eternal salvation, but also cares for “all things 
necessary” (Nooddruft’ in the Dutch translation) of one’s own and other’s 
body. (LD 9.26, cf. 42. 111; 50.125; 45.118;46.121, cf. Busch 1998:125). 
That the human body is finite and mortal, so evident in the context of 
physical health care, goes also without saying in the HC. It speaks about 
the comfort in life and death  - with an emphasis on death. If our Savior 
does not intervene, we have to be prepared for the total destruction of our 
existence at the end of our life (LD 4.11 compared with 22.57, 58). 
The HC also strongly emphasizes the dependency of the human being 
in its care relationship with God. Dependency is also a strong element in 
the ethics of care, in resistance to the liberal ideology of self-sufficiency 
(Held 2006). Gód is the primordial One-Who-Cares; we are the Cared-for, 
the HC claims. How we flourish, depends on the care given to us. In the 
HC, God as our Creator is the presupposition of our existence. He is our 
Alpha and Omega. Having faith in God the Creator means to acknowledge 
that I am not my own origin.9 Sin alienates us from our origin. Having faith 
in God as my Savior (LD 5-7, 11-19) expresses in an even stronger sense 
our dependency on God’s justification. 
In the HC, the relationship between God and humanity is a hierarchical 
one. God is the heavenly Father, who redeems and preserves his children 
(by adoption, LD 13.33) from evil (LD 1.1). This does not mean however, 
that the believer is only considered a passive object of divine care. The 
redeemed and thankful sinner is a free human being, expecting “all 
9 “Ich entspringe nicht mir selbst” (Busch 1998: 120)
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good from God only, and love, fear, and honor Him with my whole heart” 
(LD 34.94, First Commandment). 
Only 9 articles in the HC concern “Man’s misery”, 74 are about his 
redemption and 26 are dedicated to his thankfulness. But it cannot be 
denied that the relationship between the majestic God and the – we have 
to admit - “courageous” (Barth 1947:21) acting human being is a one-sided 
relationship of dependency. We are dependent on “the will of my Father 
in heaven” (LD 1.1.) “my faithful Father” (LD 9.26), “his fatherly hand” 
(LD 10.27), “our faithful God and Father” (LD10.28). The sovereignty of this 
father-God is so clear, that discerning elements of anthropocentrism in the 
HC is a clear misreading (Barth 1947:19). 
The care relationship between Father and “child” (cf. LD 13.33) is – as 
any care relationship is, at least in the beginning – depicted in the HC 
as strongly asymmetric. The triune God is the one who cares, we are the 
ones being cared for. This is evident for God as our Creator, but even 
more in the redemptive work in Jesus Christ, the Son. (LD 5-19; cf. 1.1 “his 
precious blood”). It can be read as an act of God’s self sacrifice out of love 
for his creation. The justification is an ultimate act of care: God is giving 
his beloved life for our’s. 
I shall not go into an evaluation of the role Anselmian satisfaction 
doctrine plays in the HC vision on atonement. But with the outcomes of 
recent discussions in mind within the ethics of care, about the relationship 
between justice and care, the emphasis put by the HC on God’s justice 
might be understood not as a strange element in, but as an intrinsic part 
of the dynamic care relationship between God and humanity. Justice, 
understood within the framework of the care paradigm, is not its opposite. 
“God is indeed merciful, but He is likewise just”, the HC states in its 
introduction of the Second Part on Man’s Redemption (italics mine). What 
does “likewise” mean in this context? When one starts to think from the 
perspective of justice, understood as rational impartiality, care – seen as 
emotional preference, neglecting or refusing impartiality – is a spoilsport. 
In a modern theory of justice, care is a strange element. Often justice 
and care are played off against each other as rational against emotional, 
public against private. In case of conflict, justice prevails (cf. Pettersen 
2008:85-112) “Care” is a nice mother, who only can say to her rebellious 
children: Just wait until father gets home”(Claassens 2004:11f.). “Justice” 
then, is the father, restoring order. In the perspective of an ethics of 
care, however, care gets priority, and justice is part of the care process 
(Johnson 1993:181-185). 
Arguing against the sentimentalization of care, however, it is right to 
emphasize that disciplining and punishment are not strange elements in, 
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but belong to the heart of care. Care also hurts. Likewise, in the HC, God’s 
mercy expresses itself ín his justice (LD 4.11), and vice versa. Within the 
logic of its development and structure, the satisfaction doctrine can be 
seen as a – necessary – part of the dynamics of the care relationship which 
God maintains with humanity; it is not its essence, nor its final word. Its 
essence is God’s self sacrificing care in Jesus Christ.
4. CARING CREATURES 
In the HC, corresponding to the divine care in creation and redemption, 
human beings, created in the image of God, are considered to embody 
care. In an elementary sense, as beings who worry about their daily bread, 
they have to satisfy their basic needs by “care and labour” (LD 50.125). But 
also as social beings who are called to care about and take care of others. 
In its interpretation of the Second Table of the Law, the HC defends a 
deliberate – if one is allowed to say anachronistically – non-liberal agapist 
ethics of care. It is not the harm principle that rules the relationships 
between citizens of the common wealth, but neighbour love. 
The fifth commandment calls children to “show honour, love, and 
faithfulness to their parents” but also to “bear patiently with their 
infirmities” (LD 39.104); the sixth commandment “You shall not murder” 
does not receive a negative and minimalist explanation from a non-harm 
perspective, but is interpreted maximally as a positive duty to take care of 
the neighbour. Envy, hate, anger, and desire of revenge are depicted as 
hidden murders (LD 40.106). To love our neighbour as ourselves, means: 
“to show patience, peace, meekness, mercy, and kindness toward him, 
and to prevent his hurt as much as possible; also, to do good even unto our 
enemies.”(LD 40.107) This ethos does not fit into a social contract theory 
which founds the relationship with the unknown other on a utilitarian do ut 
des calculation. The HC aims at a public ethos of mutual care. Those who 
are liberated from sin aren’t calculating their thankfulness. The do ut des 
is replaced by a do, quia mihi datum est; I give because much has been 
given to me (cf. Ricoeur 1995). Therefore, the interpretation of the eighth 
commandment (“You shall not steal”) also receives a positive turn: where 
I can and may, I am supposed to further my neighbour’s good (LD 42.111). 
Also the ninth commandment (“You shall not bear false witness against 
your neighbour”) is maximalized into the exhortation to “defend and 
promote my neighbour’s good name, in so far as I can” (LD 43.112). 
De Lange Elements for a theology of care
166
5. PROVIDENCE: A MOTHERING FATHER 
The HC care perspective shows itself fully in the image of a provident God, 
described in Lord’s Day 9 and 10. “The God of Lord’s Day 10” is the One 
who Cares and not – as in Maarten ‘t Hart’s description – “the god who 
hates people so intensely that he invented throat cancer for them”. 
For the heavenly father of the HC is a father with motherly characteristics. 
As a thought experiment, one might exchange the name “Father” in the HC 
by “Mother”. That may colour our thinking about providence quite differently. 
There is ample scriptural support for the use of a motherly metaphor for 
the God who cares, as Juliana Claassens has shown in her inspiring book 
on The God who provides (Claassens 2004; cf. also Claassens 2012:41-64). 
She pictures God as the “nursing Mother of the Universe”, providing her 
children with food and life. Inspired by the work of Elisabeth Johnson, she 
investigates the biblical potential for female imagery for God. Claassens 
concludes, after exploring the Hebrew Scriptures, that “[t]o imagine the God 
who feeds all creation in terms of a mother who is intimately involved with 
her children has the effect of understanding God as caring about the most 
basic needs of life in our daily struggles.” (Claassens 2004:40). Imagining 
God as Mother is helpful to criticize the patriarchal, androcentric image of 
God as a ruler who, indifferently and uninvolved, stands at a distance from 
his creation, unrelated to his creatures. The mother metaphor brings us 
closer to the Trinitarian thinking that prevails in the HC: God as a liberating, 
incarnational, passionate, relational, suffering God. A God essentially in 
relation, rather than an essence in itself. Our image of divine providence 
changes, if we no longer understand the “almighty, everywhere-present 
power of God”, where Lord’s Day 10 starts with, as the imperial power of a 
hierarchical, cosmic ruler, but as the power of love of a God, mothering the 
Universe. God’s creative presence is a “primordial upwelling of the power 
of being and divine acts of giving life, sustaining it, and encouraging it to 
grow.” (Johnson 1993:179) God the Mother, as Johnson writes, 
freely gives life to all creatures without calculating a return, loving 
them inclusively, joyfully saying the basic words of affirmation, “It is 
good that you exist.” Her creative, maternal, love is the generating 
matrix of the universe, matter, spirit, and embodied spirit alike. 
(Johnson 1993:179) 
Johnson does not plead for abolishing the image of God as father, 
replacing it completely by the image of mother. Therefore, the father 
child-relationship, so dominant in the HC as in the Bible itself, is, as a basic 
human experience, too elementary and can also express the creativity, 
protection, delight and care of a caring parent, instead of the authority 
of a domineering patriarch (Johnson 1993: 282, note 57). Is the way 
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Jesus uses the Aramaic “Abba” to address God not also characterized 
by an “intimacy of relation between Jesus and God, along with a sense 
of God’s compassion over suffering, willing good in the midst of evil”? 
(Johnson 1993:81)10 
The heavenly Father in the HC cares for his creation like a caring 
father motherly cares for his offspring. In order to clean the father image 
from misunderstanding, the voluntaristic formulation of Lord Day’s 1 that 
nothing happens “without the will of my Father in heaven” should better be 
changed into “without my (caring) Father in heaven”. Most fathers most of 
the time – also the 16th century fathers, I suppose - are in their relationship 
with their children not decision makers, but providers of care. And care 
implies risks. 
At the same time, we have to adjust our ideas of motherly care is not 
romantic or sentimental. The romantic notion of motherhood is perhaps 
a patriarchal, male bias. The biblical image of God’s motherly care is 
much more realistic and balanced, and an image “of great versatility”, 
as Juliana Claassens notes. The God who provides food in abundance is 
also punishing the rebellious child, those whom she loves. God is not only 
a nurturing, but also a disciplining Mother. (Claassens 2004:12, referring 
to Numeri 11, Deut 32) The God who feeds in the biblical texts, is also 
the Mother who powerfully manages her household, who makes sure that 
each child is fed and cared for. (Claasssens 2004:13, cf. Exod. 16:16) 
Taking the metaphor of God as the divine personification of Care (cf. the 
myth of Hyginus) helps for a better understanding of divine providence, 
I think. The HC probably stays a bit too close in the neighbourhood of 
John Calvin, to make that move easily. In line with Calvin, the HC rules out 
all hazard and accidence in its picture of God’s providence. Against the 
Epicureans, (“a pest with which the world has always been plagued at a 
distance”, Calvin, Institutes I, 16.4) who wanted, dreaming “of an inert and 
idle God,” cut through the link between God and his creation by abandoning 
creation to its own, Calvin philosophically opts for proximity with the 
Stoics, who let coincide God’s agency with the laws of the universe. The 
biblical theologian Calvin, then, argues that it is not an anonymous Logos, 
but the loving triune God that rules the universe as a heavenly Father. 
10 Johnson (1993:150) also quotes Anselm of Canterbury, the theologian who 
designed the satisfaction doctrine, for so many the stumbling block in the HC. 
Anselm prays: “But you too, good Jesus, are you not also a mother? Are you 
not a mother who likes a hen gathers her chicks beneath her wings?” 
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In the image of the Father, however, the image of an imperial ruler still 
seems to shine through. To Calvin, God represents “the disposer and ruler 
of all things”, who 
from the remotest eternity, according to his own wisdom, [he] 
decreed what he was to do, and now by his power executes what he 
decreed (Institutes I, 16.8). 
Would Calvin have been thinking differently about God’s fatherly 
providence, if he only had seen a caring mother before him instead of a 
imperial ruler? 
I don’t know whether such a reframing of providential care by imagining 
God as heavenly Mother would reassure and convince novelist Maarten ‘t 
Hart. Whatever metaphor we take for the divine, the question of the theodicy 
remains an insolvable aporia, which cannot be answered intellectually, only 
be encountered practically (Swinton 2007). There is no philosophical or 
dogmatic solution to the question how to reconcile the belief in a loving God 
with the reality of evil. We have learn to live with unanswered questions.11 
But thinking the relation of God to his creation from a theology of care 
perspective, creates an open eye for the reality of tragic suffering and 
moral evil in the world. At the origin of God’s providence lies creative love, 
not a decreeing will. The relational paradigm of care would have to take 
leave from the traces of voluntaristic individualism still present in Calvin 
and the HC, culminating in the unbiblical “the will of my Father” (LD 1.1). 
The presence of tragic suffering in the world is not the result of a divine 
decision, but remains a possibility within the care relationship of God and 
humanity. A mother does not have her children “on a string”. In the same 
way, God does not control the universe deliberately into detail, but allows 
it to take a course on its own in the presence of his persistent and enduring 
love (Weil 2002). Love is per definition a risky affair, and therefore always 
suffering love. To love requires fragility and vulnerability. Who enters a 
care relationship starts a dynamic, open-ended story. 
As Swinton writes, love is intrinsically tragic. 
It requires an opening up to the other in a way that inevitably 
makes the lover vulnerable and open to being either loved or 
broken. The world was created out of love and for love. Creation 
is fragile because it is underpinned by divine love. Which is both 
11 With Swinton (2007:68) I think, the problem of evil deserves a reframing as well; 
from a philosophical dilemma into a relational task. “How can we discover ways 
of enabling people to retain meaning and hope in the providential goodness of 
God despite the presence of evil?” 
Acta Theologica Supplementum 20 2014
169
powerful and inevitable fragile. Humans beings are fragile because 
they are made in the image of the triune God who is suffering love 
(Swinton 2007:65-66). 
Again, this is not a justification of suffering in the world. Suffering 
gets evil, when, as in ‘t Harts novel Maarten’s mother’s throat cancer, 
it withholds us from faith in God’s goodness. I think, the theology of 
the HC here touches upon its limits. The HC creates little room for the 
experience of aporia, and for the praxis of lament as an adequate response 
to the presence of evil. It does not allow the sincere believer to hold God 
accountable, as the biblical figure Job did in the book named after him. 
There is, in the HC, no legitimate place for the doubt, “that whatever evil He 
sends upon me in this valley of tears, He will turn to my good”. (LD 9. 26) 
The doctrine of providence in the HC lacks the open endedness in the 
drama of the care relationship between God and humanity. 
6. CARE: AN OPEN ENDED PROCESS
Perhaps here the strong asymmetry in the relationship between God 
and humanity becomes painfully concrete in its consequences. In the 
HC, God as the One-Who-Cares sets the rules for the relationship with 
humanity as the One-Cared-for. But every care relationship is open, risky, 
unpredictable in its course and outcome. This thought however, seems 
a thought too many for the HC. Its Carer stays a Ruler. Sure, Eberhard 
Busch is right in pointing out that the HC deals with the free God and 
free humanity. In the articles on Prayer, Busch even discerns the humanity 
“come to age”, der mündige Mensch, invited by God to participate in his 
interests (Busch 1998:272,278). He quotes Hendrikus Berkhof who once 
wrote that the most important fruit of the Holy Spirit is “that he opens up 
our mouth” (Busch 1998:272). “Speaking together with God”, “Mitsprache 
bei Gott” is Busch’ wonderful title above his section on articles 122-124. 
But how much room is left in the HC for “speaking against”? For keeping 
silence, cursing one’s birthday, crying in anger to God? 
As I said, a care relationship by definition is an open ended process, 
which is only successful (that means: can be characterized after all as 
“care”) when the one-cared-for takes an active and affirmative stance in 
it. In her seminal book on the ethics of care, Joan Tronto (1992:105-108) 
distinguishes four ethical elements in the dynamics of care: Three of them 
concern the care giver. Attentiveness (to care about); responsibility (to 
care for); competence (taking care of); the fourth, however, responsiveness 
(receiving care) refers to the “responsiveness of the care receiver to the 
care”. Care is not the result of individual agency, but is a relational process 
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in which the receiving attitude of the one cared for is an essential element, 
without which a care relationship cannot continue. Precisely this element 
returns in the HC in the third part on Thankfulness, on Ethics and Prayer. 
The relationship between God and humanity in the First and Second 
Part is dominated by dependency, in the Third Part it is characterized by 
reciprocity and mutuality. 
Recognition is essential for a care relationship, Nel Noddings, one of 
the mothers of the ethics of care, writes. 
The cared for is free to be more fully himself in the caring relation. 
Indeed, this being himself, this willing and unselfconscious revealing 
of self, is his major contribution to the relation (Noddings 1984: 73).
Noddings writes about parents and children, but she could have 
written about us in relation to God. Our coming of age, our Mündigkeit 
is our contribution to God’s care for us. Of course, even when we would 
reject God’s care, God’s care still counts as care. But it would have 
missed its aim. Care is a dynamic circle. It needs the recognition, the 
responsiveness of the one cared for, in order to become full. “Caring 
involves two parties: the one-caring and the cared-for. It is complete 
when it is fulfilled in both.” (Noddings 1984:68) Even without our thankful 
response, God remains the “ethical hero.” But his care project would have 
failed (cf. Noddings 1984:77f). Care implies communion.
It seems however, that the HC does not want to go that far. It keeps 
considering us as children fed by our heavenly Father; we’ll never become 
his intimate friends or free and easy lovers. Though there is a mystic tone in 
the HC, the distance between the Lover and Beloved is kept. As the caring 
relationship develops, it stays characterized by hierarchy and asymmetry. 
7. CARING FOR GOD? 
I think a theology of care must dare to advance one step further, invited and 
challenged by the insights and implications of its paradigm. The goal of any 
caring relationship is maturity, in which – as a teacher-student relationship 
shows in an exemplary way – the one cared for learns to stand on his or her 
own feet. “Maturity” wants to say: their relationship is no longer based on 
a basic need, but on mutual friendship, a balanced reciprocity. (Noddings 
1984:67,71; cf. Pettersen 2008:131) As Milton Mayeroff writes: “To care 
for another person, in the most significant sense, is to help him grow and 
actualize himself”(Quoted by Noddings 1984:9).
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Over time, the relationship becomes one of mutual interdependency. 
It is no longer based on vital needs, but on the search for each other’s 
good. Altruism and self sacrifice only represent one foregoing moment in a 
reciprocal relationship over time. In the end, symmetry is the internal telos 
of every care relationship. 
A genuine care relationship moves from mothering to mutuality and 
to maturity. This also applies for God and humanity. Jesus said to his 
disciples “I do not call you slaves any longer ... but I have called you 
friends” (John 15:15). What does that mean theologically? Perhaps this: 
not only that God cares for us, and we care for ourselves and others, 
but that we also should care for and take care of God. That God also is 
vulnerable and dependent on love, seeking our love. That God not only 
takes responsibility for us, but that we become also responsible for God. 
These are impossible, even blasphemous thoughts, perhaps in the spiritual 
context of the HC. But it seems to me a legitimate, mystic implication of 
the care paradigm, to be thought through. 
I’ll end with a quotation of someone who moved freely along this 
line of thought. Etty Hillesum, a 27 year old Jewish woman, living in 
Amsterdam during the Second World War, confident in God’s love despite 
the advancing of evil, wrote in her diary on July 12, 1942, before she was 
deported to the concentration camps: 
I shall try to help you, God, to stop my strength ebbing away, 
though I cannot vouch for it in advance. But one thing is becoming 
increasingly clear to me: that You cannot help us, that we must 
help You to help ourselves. And perhaps in others as well. Alas, 
there doesn’t seem to be much You Yourself can do about our 
circumstances, about our lives. Neither do I hold You responsible. 
You cannot help us, but we must help You and defend Your dwelling 
place inside us to the last (Hillesum 2002: 488f).
I conclude: the HC offers important element for a theology of care. It 
depicts the relationship between God and human beings as a dynamic an 
dramatic relationship, in which God is mainly the One Caring and humanity 
the Cared for. Though the image of God as a Father is dominant, its 
connotations are motherly. Created in the image of this God we cannot but 
care for others, for God’s creation and for ourselves. The radical thought, 
however, that we also should take care of God, as the risky part of mature 
reciprocity in the care relationship, is perhaps one thought too many for 
the HC. 
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